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A High-Wire Crusade: Republicans and the War on Poverty, 1966 
Scholarship on Lyndon B. Johnson’s Great Society has undergone a remarkable transformation in 
recent times. Prior to the early 2000s, historians widely assessed Johnson’s vision as a failure that ran 
aground on the rocks of the Vietnam War, racial animus, and a host of other contentious issues that 
emerged during the Texan’s presidency. Writing in the 1980s and 1990s, such scholars were perhaps 
unduly influenced by the electoral ascendance of an increasingly conservative Republican party that 
successful stoked public disillusionment with ‘big government’ liberalism.1 Recent scholarship has, 
however, attempted to flip this narrative on its head. Instead of focusing on its failures, historians 
have become almost awestruck by the longevity and continued growth of the Great Society’s most 
notable socio-economic policies – especially Medicare and the Elementary and Secondary Education 
Act (ESEA) – during a time of Republican ascendance. Indeed, according to Gareth Davies, the Great 
Society ‘bequeathed an era’ in federal government expansion.2 Similarly, writing in 2015, Julian Zelizer 
observed, ‘One of the most remarkable aspects of the Great Society is how much still lives with us 
today, fifty years later, so much so that most Americans regard its programs as essential 
manifestations of the national government’s responsibility to its citizens.’3 To such historians, 
Republican success in dismantling Great Society liberalism has been grossly exaggerated. 
While fresh acknowledgement of the Great Society’s substantial legacy is welcome, there is a 
danger of scholars pushing this countervailing narrative too far. The Republican party, while it has 
acquiesced to education and health care programmes, has not shown such a willingness to go along 
with other aspects of the Great Society’s legacy. Most notably, the War on Poverty – a central pillar of 
Johnson’s Great Society vision when it was passed in 1964 – was dismantled when Republicans seized 
the levers of government in 1981. Just seventeen years after its creation, it was cast aside by President 
Ronald Reagan and unceremoniously ended. Reagan, delivering a simple obituary for a programme 
that had remained controversial and often unloved during its short history, pithily declared: ‘poverty 
won.’4 Given its rapid fall from grace, one historian justifiably deems the War on Poverty ‘one of the 
greatest failures of twentieth-century liberalism.’5 Such a failure cannot be brushed under the carpet 
by those arguing for greater recognition of the Great Society’s endurance – especially as the 
consequences for liberals who dreamed of eradicating want from American society continue to 
endure. Undeniably, the impetus to do battle with poverty that was briefly experienced in the 1960s 
and early 1970s has largely left an American political culture that prefers to focus on the ‘the middle 
class.’ Michael Katz even labels poverty a ‘third rail’ which twenty-first century politicians dare not 
touch.6  
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The War on Poverty, unlike other aspects of the Great Society, never built substantial support 
in the opposition party. Most Republicans opposed the antipoverty effort from its inception and ended 
the programme as soon as it was politically feasible. Nonetheless, historians of the War on Poverty 
have cited a myriad of reasons – including racism, Johnson’s overpromising rhetoric, and politically 
unrealistic demands from liberals – in order to understand the poverty war’s failure and yet have 
ignored the Republican elephant in the room.7 None have sufficiently analysed how the Republican 
party were a check to its overall success, or indeed, how during the 1960s, they shaped the antipoverty 
effort’s implementation. This article begins to fill this scholarly lacuna by examining GOP actions and 
rhetoric towards the War on Poverty in 1966 – a year in which the antipoverty effort faced a 
contentious congressional renewal that allowed Republicans to impact how the ‘war’ was being 
fought, while also playing a starring role in the Republican campaign against Johnson’s Great Society 
during the midterm elections. In these twin developments, it becomes evident that the antipoverty 
effort was on borrowed time until the Republican party seized power, and the limits of the Great 
Society’s success re-emerge.  
Republicans and the War on Poverty 
The Republican party’s overall approach to the War on Poverty across the programme’s seventeen-
year lifespan was characterised by relentless – and sometimes fierce – opposition. Certainly, most 
elected Republicans opposed the Economic Opportunity Act (EOA) of 1964 from the outset. The EOA 
– the bedrock legislation for the War on Poverty – was an experimental package that rested on five 
key pillars: job training, community action, volunteerism, incentives for businesses to hire particularly 
hard-hit or stigmatised groups, and coordination of these efforts under the watchful eye of an Office 
of Economic Opportunity (OEO). In addition to being experimental, it also had a relatively small 
appropriation of under $1 billion when it was first passed. Republicans, however, believed it to be an 
expensive government giveaway to the poor that was designed to boost LBJ’s election efforts in 1964, 
while also suspecting that it was enlarging the federal government’s power at the expense of the 
states and the private sector. As the War on Poverty became reality from 1965 onwards, Republicans 
only found more reasons to dislike the antipoverty effort. Most elected Republicans believed that the 
OEO was partisan, corrupt, and wasteful. Moreover, they opportunistically soured on a project that 
many working-class whites came to resent in the belief that the OEO was only helping urban black 
Americans – thus presenting the GOP with a shot at attracting the bedrock voter of the Democratic 
party’s New Deal coalition.8 In short, most Republicans disliked the War on Poverty from the 
beginning, and their distaste only grew with each passing year. 
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In 1966, however, the GOP approach to Johnson’s anti-poverty efforts was complex. In 
Congress, the EOA was up for renewal and instead of calling for the War on Poverty’s full repeal (as 
many congressional Republicans would have liked to do) the leadership chose to design and offer their 
own moderate antipoverty alternative – the “Opportunity Crusade”.* Hardly an extreme list of 
proposals, the Republican Crusade called for a reprioritising of funding for antipoverty efforts towards 
the more popular programmes of the War on Poverty, more influence for the states and the poor 
themselves, and for reorganising which federal departments ran the programmes. At the same time 
as appearing conciliatory in Congress, various Republicans relentlessly attacked the War on Poverty 
on the campaign trail in the hopes of making the increasingly unpopular antipoverty effort the symbol 
of Great Society liberalism writ large.9 Again, however, rather than dismiss any “war on poverty” 
entirely, these Republicans also offered their own creative solutions to eradicating hardship. 
This GOP high-wire act was pursued for two reasons. Firstly, elected Republicans were a more 
ideologically diverse group in the 1960s than they would be in the 1970s, and especially in the 1980s. 
Indeed, in 1966, the party had four discernible factions – fundamentalists, stalwarts, moderates, and 
progressives.10 Fundamentalists were a rising force in the party and had seized the presidential 
nomination when Barry Goldwater ran in 1964, but it would be another fifteen years until they seized 
control of the party. Typically, fundamentalists emerged from the ‘Sunbelt’, an area running from 
Southern California to Virginia, and opposed all social welfare programmes. In 1966, Ronald Reagan 
would emerge as the standard bearer for this group (and perhaps the most anti-War on Poverty 
candidate of the year). The largest group in the party were stalwarts, who tended to reside in the 
Republican heartlands of the Midwest and Mountain states. Unlike fundamentalists, they had voted 
for the civil rights acts in 1964 and 1965, but, led by House Minority Leader, Gerald Ford (R-MI), they 
also opposed most of Johnson’s Great Society programmes. Once Medicare and ESEA were on the 
books, however, stalwarts often became amenable to voting for increased funding for such 
programmes.11 Moderates, most evident in the mid-Atlantic states, had largely voted in favour of 
Democratic social programmes in healthcare and education, while remaining sceptical of the War on 
Poverty that they perceived as either wasteful, corrupt, or both. Michigan Governor, George Romney, 
for instance, deplored the federal nature of the War on Poverty and sought to form voluntary alliances 
between business and local government to support those in poverty. Finally, progressives, who were 
the smallest faction in the party but enjoyed disproportionate influence in the Senate, tended to offer 
solutions that could have been devised by a liberal Democrat, albeit with a greater scepticism of 
                                                          
* ‘Opportunity Crusade’ was the name suggested in 1964 by Johnson’s eventual vice-president Hubert 
Humphrey when the War on Poverty was being crafted. It’s unclear, however, if Republicans were aware of 
this fact. 
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anything that smacked of government welfare. Edward Brooke from Massachusetts, who became the 
first ever African-American directly elected to the Senate in 1966, personified this approach. Bearing 
this ideological mix in mind, it is important to note that the GOP in 1966 were also striving for greater 
party unity following the disastrous 1964 election during which many moderates and progressives 
even refused to endorse their own presidential candidate.12 As such, with Republicans attempting 
project a more cohesive public image to suggest a readiness for governance, the party had to take all 
ideological views on board when crafting their congressional opposition and political messaging. 
Another motivating factor for the complex approach was the political context in which 
Republicans were operating. The War on Poverty’s passage in 1964 appeared to trap the GOP in the 
same dynamic that had stymied the party over the previous thirty years since Franklin D. Roosevelt 
had initiated the New Deal. Over that time, Robert Mason convincingly argues, the GOP – frequently 
in the minority in Congress and with only war hero Dwight Eisenhower occupying the White House 
since 1933 – failed to deal with a Democratic agenda that advocated ‘Support for activist government 
in pursuit of economic prosperity and welfare guarantees,’ largely because ‘the resulting Republican 
alternative was often reactive, oppositional, and even negative.’13 As a result, Democrats continued 
to promise and win elections, while Republicans blocked and lost at the ballot box, and in the process 
many in the party became overly comfortable in the minority. Brooke, a GOP rising star, captured the 
essence of this phenomenon in reflecting on the Republican performance in 1964. Brooke bemoaned 
the abundance ‘of Republicans who would rather lose the ball game just as long as they decide who 
is going to pitch.’ Continuing, Brooke also regretted the negative reputation attached to the GOP 
resulting from the party’s reactive approach: ‘You see, the Republican Party, in rejecting the 
Democratic Party’s solutions to problems, often gives the impression to the people that it is rejecting 
the existence of the problems themselves.’14 Republicans were therefore put in the position of 
seeming to be against ending hardship if they came out too harshly against the idea of a “war on 
poverty”, and when they did come out against the bill, it played into the long-established Democratic 
narrative that Republicans were merely the “Party of No”. Even more troublesome for Republicans, 
opposing a war on poverty echoed another disparaging term applied to the party: the “Party of 
Privilege”. As such, Republicans spent most of the 89th Congress (1965-67) offering what party leaders 
termed ‘constructive alternatives’ to a host of Johnson’s Great Society proposals. 
Despite already being passed in the 88th Congress, no legislation featured more prominently 
in this new Republican blueprint than the EOA. When the bill had passed in September 1964, 87 
percent of House Republicans voted against the measure, while in the Senate, 69 percent of 
Republican senators voted against (the upper chamber was the sole institution where Republican 
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progressives were a substantial force during the 1960s). When compared with most other Great 
Society legislation, the War on Poverty thus enjoyed paltry bi-partisan support from the outset. 
In 1965, armed with large liberal majorities in Congress, Johnson requested a doubling of 
funds for antipoverty programmes, which were already receiving critical commentary in the media. 
Republicans, otherwise bereft of power for much of the Congressional term, therefore saw the EOA’s 
renewal as an opportunity to strike at a key element of LBJ’s Great Society. House Republicans, led by 
new Minority Leader, Gerald Ford, exuded a sense of purpose that had been sorely lacking in the 
previous regime. Ford appointed two rising stars among the House Republican caucus in Al Quie (R-
MN) and Charles Goodell (R-NY) – dubbed the ‘Young Turks’ – to lead the charge against the War on 
Poverty. At the time, both were stalwarts (Goodell would drift towards more moderate positions as 
the 1960s wore on, before being appointed to fill Robert Kennedy’s vacant Senate seat in 1968) and 
they were part of a new generation of congressional Republicans who were desperate to escape the 
minority status to which many older elected members had become too comfortably accustomed. 
Quie, who one scholar describes as the ‘kind of attractive young face that the GOP needed if it were 
to combat the appeal of [John F. Kennedy’s] Camelot,’ used the War on Poverty’s controversies to 
position himself, and thus his party, on the side of the poor who – according to Quie – were being 
failed by the Administration’s offering.15 It was therefore hoped that dynamic messengers from a new 
Republican generation and a more compassionate sounding position would mute charges of GOP 
negativism. 
 Republicans, however, largely failed to get a hearing in 1965 as the Great Society’s legislative 
tide surged through the first session of the 89th Congress. Despite bitter Republican complaints over 
the conduct of the War on Poverty, the EOA’s first renewal saw antipoverty funds doubled and the 
OEO’s authority strengthened, when a governor’s veto of poverty programmes was removed from the 
initial legislation.16 This was much to the dismay of Republicans who saw this as a naked federal power 
grab. Nonetheless, the Watts Riots that broke out in August 1965 raised challenging questions about 
the antipoverty effort’s effectiveness, exposed divisions in the Democratic party, and disillusioned 
many traditionally Democratic white working-class Americans over the War on Poverty’s desirability 
as they perceived it to be disproportionately helping ungrateful African-Americans. These events, 
combined with the strain put on the budget and the American body politic by a major increase in 
troops being sent to fight in Vietnam, meant that Republicans would not remain irrelevant for long.  
 With the midterm elections fast approaching, the War on Poverty’s popularity continued to 
diminish. Having enjoyed two-thirds approval from the public in January 1966, support had fallen to 
57 per cent by June, far below other Great Society social welfare programmes. Respondents, asked 
which federal spending programmes they would like to see cut, cited ‘Aid to Cities’, ‘Farm Subsidies’, 
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and the ‘War on Poverty’ as three of the top four. Out of the most common responses, only the ‘Space 
Program’ did not directly affect the nation’s poor.17 While it is impossible to prove the reason for the 
drop in the War on Poverty’s support, Republicans had done their level best throughout 1966 to 
hasten the War on Poverty’s decline in popularity. This was done by highlighting the flaws of 
antipoverty effort in Congress and the campaign trail, but also, firstly, by offering a constructive 
Republican alternative. 
 
The Opportunity Crusade 
The Republican strategy in offering the Opportunity Crusade during 1966 was twofold. On the one 
hand, Quie and Goodell, having spent much of 1965 criticising the War on Poverty, redoubled their 
efforts to discredit the OEO’s record. At the same time, they sought to present the Republican party 
as the antipoverty effort’s saviours; without significant changes, Quie argued, the War on Poverty 
would be abandoned.18 Moreover, with the antipoverty effort now in its second year, Republicans 
were increasingly dismissive of Democratic arguments that the antipoverty effort would find its feet 
once it was over its teething problems. Rebutting such suggestions, Quie bluntly stated that ‘The 
Administration’s War on Poverty is no longer in its infancy and the time for target practice is over.’19 
It was high time, in the words of Goodell, for ‘a complete substitute for the President’s lagging war on 
poverty.’20 In March, both men duly launched the Opportunity Crusade in the lower chamber.  
 While the Opportunity Crusade was an extensive and multi-faceted opposition proposal – the 
draft of the bill ran to over one hundred pages – it was, boiled down, essentially calling for five key 
changes: fewer responsibilities for the OEO, more participation by the poor in their own struggle 
against poverty, more permanent jobs for the poor, an increase in the private sector’s role, and 
reduced federal authority. Quie and Goodell supported these proposals with thirty-eight ‘poverty 
memos’ that were released between March and April and served, according to Goodell, as a way of 
‘reciting the problems with the poverty program.’21 
 Primarily, the Crusade proposed stripping the OEO of all responsibilities, excepting 
Community Action and Volunteers in Service to America (VISTA). As such, the GOP proposal advocated 
shifting job training initiatives, such as the Job Corps and Neighborhood Youth Corps, to the 
Department of Labor, while all education programmes, such as the popular Head Start (which would 
enjoy an increased budget), to the Office of Education. This negative approach to the OEO is 
unsurprising as Republican feelings towards the department ran the gambit from suspicion to outright 
hostility. Goodell referred to OEO Director Sargent Shriver’s newly created agency as the ‘fuddle 
factory’ and vowed that the Opportunity Crusade would ‘eliminate the waste and scandal and abuses’ 
that the New Yorker believed characterised the OEO.22  
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Republican criticisms also suggested that many in the GOP saw the OEO as a tool of the 
Democratic party. Quie and Goodell’s poverty memos often drew upon examples of the OEO’s 
excessive patronage to city politicians – most of whom belonged to Shriver’s own party. For instance, 
Goodell charged a Boston Community Action Agency (CAA) with ‘political favoritism’ and the next day 
noted that CAAs across the country had suffered because ‘Too often the big city politician has taken 
over.’23 Quie cited the OEO’s funding of a hotel renovation in West Virginia under the pretence of 
setting up a Job Corps centre where the State Commerce Commissioner – a Democrat – was president 
of the corporation that owned the hotel. Linking the poverty programme to a frequent Republican 
charge being levelled at Lyndon Johnson primarily over his prosecution of the Vietnam War, Quie 
suggested that there existed a ‘Credibility Gap at [the] OEO.’24 As such, the OEO – founded as a 
coordination agency – would have had little left to coordinate under Republican plans. 
 Community Action – the one major programme that would have remained in OEO hands 
under the Republican proposal – was earmarked for significant alteration. When the EOA had original 
been drawn up, Community Action was the antipoverty package’s least understood part. Community 
Action Programs (CAPs) were to form Community Action Agencies (CAA) to tackle problems in rural 
and urban communities. Demanding ‘maximum feasible participation’ from local communities, CAPs 
had to seek funding and approval from the federal OEO before beginning. As such, this aspect of the 
War on Poverty – despite its focus on local communities – came under strong Republican criticism for 
giving too much power to the federal government at the expense of states and localities. Furthermore, 
the hazy nature of the phrase ‘maximum feasible participation’ meant that CAPs often became 
battlegrounds for fights between local community leaders and the local political establishment.25 
Therefore, it was surprising that the Opportunity Crusade budget set federal funding for CAPs at 
$700m – a vast increase on the $475 million requested by the Johnson administration.26 Secondly, 
Quie and Goodell proposed that the poor be guaranteed one-third representation on poverty boards. 
Their rationale for the guaranteed representation was that the War on Poverty had failed to achieve 
the ‘maximum feasible participation’ on behalf of the poor for which the EOA had legislated. The two 
Republicans cited events, such as the Watts riots in 1965, and the prospect of future widespread riots 
as proof of the OEO’s failure to include the poor. They suggested that implementation of the one-third 
rule would help avoid violence and lack of participation in future.27 
 While Quie and Goodell’s proposed doubling of federal funds for Community Action may have 
been in good faith, it is also possible that they saw a further opportunity to divide Democrats. By 1966, 
there were over 1000 CAAs in existence, the majority were in urban areas, and many of them were 
causing headaches for big-city Mayors – most of whom were Democrats.28 Quie and Goodell stoked 
the fires of Democratic division, proposing a mayor’s veto with relation to CAAs. They quoted Rep. 
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Adam Clayton Powell (D-NY), the House Education and Labor Committee’s (through which the EOA 
was reported) controversial chairman, as saying: ‘If we have this mayors’ veto, then I’m ready to wash 
this war on poverty right down the drain and forget it.’29 The flamboyant Powell, who saw CAAs as a 
means to provide direct services for his constituents, was also in conflict with New York City residents 
who saw Community Action as a vehicle for social action and protest.30 Thus, Community Action 
stirred many layers of division in Democratic-controlled cities. 
Furthermore, while many CAAs undoubtedly did important and successful work, there were 
also stories emerging from Community Action that embarrassed the Johnson administration during 
1966.31 For example, the Harlem CAA in New York City – HARYOU-ACT – indulged in poor financial 
practises that left it over-budget while paying high salaries to its employees. Later in the year, it stood 
accused of funding revolutionary Black Nationalist, LeRoi Jones.32 At the other end of the ideological 
spectrum, Goodell pointed to a CAA in San Jose, California where only three elected representatives 
turned up to a poverty board meeting, and one of them was member of the far-right John Birch 
Society.33 For Republicans looking to discredit the War on Poverty while simultaneously exploiting 
divisions in the Democratic party, inflating the importance of Community Action made great sense. It 
is also worth noting that most Republicans represented rural and suburban districts, and therefore 
difficult changes to the predominantly urban Community Action would have little effect on the GOP.  
The main job training programmes – the Job Corps and the Neighborhood Youth Corps – were 
different in this regard because they also operated in rural, small-town, and suburban America. Here, 
Quie and Goodell assured Congress that the Opportunity Crusade would do a better job of providing 
more ‘productive and dignified’ jobs while also interacting with the private sector more effectively 
than the OEO.34 On the first point, Republicans often derided the War on Poverty’s job training 
placements as placing poor youngsters in dead-end jobs, such as ‘leaf raking and make-work in public 
employment.’35 Therefore, the Opportunity Crusade included an Industrial Youth Corps (IYC) that 
would provide incentives for private companies to train unskilled youths and, in exchange, the youths 
would be paid only one-third of the minimum wage for their labour. The IYC, according to Quie, would 
provide ‘the kinds of jobs which would make them taxpaying citizens who would be an asset to the 
country rather than a burden and taking from the tax revenues of the Federal Government.’36 Youth 
unemployment, Quie and Goodell argued, had stubbornly remained at 12 per cent over the previous 
five years because the minimum wage was pricing young people out of the market.37 This was, of 
course, a convenient argument for Republicans who, more often than not, opposed minimum wage 
laws. 
The IYC proposal was coupled with another overt appeal to the private sector – the Human 
Investment Act (HIA). This Act called for a seven per cent tax credit to employers if they engaged in 
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certain types of employee training. The HIA would act as an incentive for employers to engage in 
training of the poor and unemployed that would offset other proposed reductions in federal spending. 
Indeed, the Opportunity Crusade proposed that private companies would pay two-thirds of the 
trainees’ wages rather than the ten percent the companies currently contributed under Johnson’s War 
on Poverty. This meant a reduction in federal spending on job training and allowed Quie and Goodell 
to claim that ‘The Opportunity Crusade will help more poor people while spending $200 million less 
than the war on poverty.’38 
This focus on private enterprise was an issue around which the ideologically diverse 
Republican party could unite, and the Opportunity Crusade’s final aspect was similar in this respect. 
During its launch, Goodell asserted that the Opportunity Crusade would ‘enlist states as partners’ in 
the war against poverty. The clear implication was that the OEO was acting on its own wishes and not 
engaging in state consultation. In its place, Republicans proposed to introduce ‘Revenue Sharing’, 
which would see states receive bloc grants from the federal government with no strings attached and 
therefore reduce the control that OEO could exert on the States. 
All in all, the Opportunity Crusade was irrefutably a thorough opposition proposal that stood 
in contrast to the GOP’s record of negativism. Moreover, while the Crusade took sharp aim at the OEO, 
it was an altogether moderate proposal from a stalwart-dominated House Republican caucus. The 
Crusade drew heavily upon both the War on Poverty’s failures but also, largely, upon Republican 
ideological principles. When the EOA’s renewal reached Congress in September, House Republicans 
were now armed with their own proposal and were ready for a fight.  
 
Minority Muscle 
With an election nearing, the stakes over the EOA’s renewal were high and Republicans duly arrived 
with a long list of grievances but also a great number of alternatives. Rep. William Ayres (R-OH), a 
stalwart and perennial foe of the War on Poverty, set the tone during the first day of debate on 
September 26th when he told the lower chamber that ‘I am of the opinion [...] that there are very few 
Members of this body who really believe in their hearts that this is good legislation.’39 While many 
Democrats robustly defended the antipoverty initiatives, Republicans echoed Ayres’ sentiments. Over 
the next four days, the War on Poverty was subjected to harsh Republican rancour, the type of which 
few other Great Society ventures would endure. Joseph Loftus, a New York Times journalist, observed 
the bitterness of the EOA debate, noting that it was marked by politicians of both parties shouting 
‘politics!’ at each other.40 
 Revealingly, it was moderate House Republicans – including some who had voted for the 
EOA’s previous two incarnations – who led the charge against the War on Poverty. Rep. William Cahill 
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(R-NJ), after noting his previous support, outlined his voting dilemma during the opening debate: ‘I do 
not know what I am going to do this time, because I am deeply concerned personally about what I 
conceive to be political motivations in this bill. More importantly ... the American public is deeply 
concerned.’41 California Rep. Alphonso Bell (R-CA), another moderate, rose on September 27th to lead 
a long monologue of ‘I told you so’ to those who had initially voted for the War on Poverty.42 Bell, who 
voted for other Great Society legislation, but against the original EOA, told the House that those who 
had voted against the War on Poverty had ‘had our votes vindicated.’ He believed that Congress had 
been ‘naïve’ as ‘none of us realized in 1964, when we enacted the Economic Opportunity Act, just how 
formidable a task we had taken on.’ His specific complaints related to the ‘impossible task’ facing the 
OEO, which was expected to juggle five programmes. While he conceded the popularity of Head Start, 
Bell warned that if responsibility for the programme was not shifted from the OEO to the Office of 
Education, Head Start would be stifled by OEO confusion. Bell concluded his anti-EOA soliloquy by 
quoting an Iowa school superintendent who had been waiting months for OEO funds and had said of 
the War on Poverty’s help: ‘We're getting to the point where we don’t know if it’s worth it.’43  
Bell’s testimony was damning of the OEO, but it paled in comparison to that of his fellow 
moderate Republican – Paul Fino (R-NY). Fino, a New Yorker who had voted for the EOA on both 
previous occasions, had a moderate voting record but would, as the Johnson presidency progressed, 
emerge as one of the loudest proponents of racial conservatism in the GOP. The Bronx congressman 
denounced his previous votes and told his fellow representatives: 
I have become completely disenchanted with the whole concept for rooting poverty out of the 
American soil. I might go further and admit that I am disgusted with these glamorous-sounding 
programs that have and will continue to produce confusion, hate, bitterness and misuse of our 
taxpayers’ money. 
 
Calling the War on Poverty a ‘shabby, disgraceful thing [that] has let American down,’ Fino’s criticisms 
were a mix of traditional GOP arguments over OEO waste and corruption combined with white 
backlash fears roused by the Watts riots and anxiety over the decline of morality in the United States. 
Speaking of the Job Corps, Fino asked, ‘Why spend $370,000 getting [the poor] special blazers? I know 
another type of outfit they could wear. It has brass buttons too. I firmly believe we ought to draft out 
the Nation’s punks and hoods instead of coddling and paying them in the Job Corps.’ Mocking OEO 
employees as ‘poverty beatniks and troublemakers,’ the congressman defiantly argued that Congress 
should ‘say ‘no’ in definite terms to care and feeding of punks, rioters and black nationalists.’44 
 Democrats, who had been engaged in a bitter dispute over Adam Clayton Powell’s handling 
of the EOA bill during the committee phase, closed ranks when they finally realised that the extent of 
Republican opposition to the EOA threatened the $1.75 billion funding allocation for antipoverty 
measures.45 Rallying to the support of the War on Poverty, Democrats sought to discredit Republican 
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criticisms and alternatives. Before addressing the detail of Republican proposals, numerous 
Democrats situated GOP criticisms within a long history of Republican negativism towards Democratic 
social welfare programmes.46 Affirming the “Party of No” narrative, Rep. James O’Hara (D-MI) 
described Republican charges as ‘familiar old friends to all of us, polished by the frequency of their 
use […] like an old slipper, almost comfortable from age alone.’47 New Jersey’s Charles Joelson backed 
up O’Hara, asserting that ‘the minority report, in the typical minority fashion, was negative.’ According 
to Joelson, ‘The Republican substitute is not an opportunity crusade: it is just opportunity delayed, 
opportunity mislaid, and opportunity dismayed.’48 
Despite the strong riposte from Democrats favourable to the War on Poverty, there were also 
reminders that a strengthened Conservative Coalition between Republicans and conservative 
Southern Democrats after the 1966 midterms could endanger antipoverty programmes.† Many 
Southern Democrats – some of whom had voted against the original EOA – agreed with their GOP 
colleagues on the War on Poverty’s failures. One such example was Rep. Charles Bennett (D-FL), who 
blamed the poor execution of poverty programmes for the increase in race riots. Bennett charged that 
the War on Poverty ‘has contributed more than any other single factor to the riots and unrest among 
the underprivileged of our country. It is impossible to legislate self-respect.’ The Jacksonville-based 
Democrat concluded – in ideological harmony with the majority of Republicans – that American free 
enterprise should fight poverty.49 For the time being, however, both Bennett and the Republicans 
found themselves on the wrong side of the voting tally. The Opportunity Crusade – which Bennett 
supported – was defeated handily (228-117 against, with all but six Republicans voting in favour) when 
it was proposed by Quie on September 28th. Much to Johnson’s relief, enough Democrats remained 
loyal to the President’s signature legislation. 
Rather than accept defeat, House Republicans moved onto Plan B – offering a total of 33 
amendments to the EOA before final passage – and it was during this process that Quie and Goodell’s 
work bore fruit.50 The most substantial change to the EOA as it made its way through the House was 
Quie’s amendment that the representatives of the poor must make up one-third of every poverty 
board. The OEO attempted to stave off the one-third proposal by releasing statistics that showed 29 
per cent of CAAs were already so constituted. This was challenged by Loftus in the New York Times, 
who argued that these representatives could have been political appointees.51 Ultimately, the 
attempted rebuff was to no avail as the Quie amendment was adopted, ensuring that the effort 
invested in proposing constructive Republican alternatives was not in vain. The amendment, after all, 
was directly lifted from the Opportunity Crusade and it resulted in positive headlines for the GOP. 
                                                          
† The Conservative Coalition, which had traditionally been a check on liberal initiatives since the 1938 midterm 
elections, was significantly weakened by the 1964 liberal landslide and Johnson’s astute cajoling of Southern 
Democrats to support his Great Society measures.  
12 
 
Indeed, the New York Times editorialised that ‘One of the interesting developments of the [EOA] 
debate was a Democratic concession that let the Republicans become the champions of “maximum 
feasible participation” by the poor.’52  
Republicans also exercised influence when the EOA arrived in the Senate in early October. The 
GOP, displaying awareness of white backlash sentiment to the further race riots that had taken place 
in the summer, provided the votes to ensure acceptance of Sen. Harry Byrd’s (D-VA) amendment 
requiring that the EOA bar assistance to ‘anyone who incited or carried on a riot or was a member of 
a subversive organization.’53 Elsewhere, California Republican George Murphy successfully had the 
Hatch Act applied to the EOA, thus prohibiting OEO employees from engaging in political activity. This 
development seemed to lend credence to Republican claims that antipoverty workers were straying 
into partisan territory (such as voter registration for the Democrats) while doing their work.54 
Meanwhile, Sen. Winston Prouty’s (R-VT) accepted amendment that earmarked 36 per cent of 
Community Action funds for Head Start confirmed the bipartisan support for that programme that 
would largely endure for the following five decades.55 Most significantly, Senate Minority Leader 
Everett Dirksen’s (R-IL) proposal to reduce the appropriation from the $2.5 billion requested by the 
President to the $1.75 billion approved by the House was passed thanks to GOP votes. 
The EOA debate had confirmed that most Republicans in both houses of Congress had 
identified the War on Poverty as a weak spot in the Great Society’s armoury. Nonetheless, by offering 
a comprehensive alternative, Republicans were able to parry charges of negativism as the midterm 
election approached. Moreover, the Republican success in altering the EOA in 1966 was an 
unexpected fillip for the GOP during the ‘Rubber Stamp Congress’, famous for its willingness to back 
almost all of Johnson’s wishes. Greater success, however, lay in the near future, and again the War on 
Poverty was to play a key role. 
 
Poverty Politics on the Campaign Trail 
The 1966 midterms have largely been portrayed by historians as representing a turning point; 
heralding an epochal shift from New Deal/Great Society liberalism to modern conservatism that would 
unfold over the next two decades.56 Again, however, there is a danger of overstating this narrative. 
The elections did not constitute a backlash to the Great Society per se – only extremists advocated a 
repeal of Medicare, Medicaid, ESEA, civil rights laws, liberalised immigration, or consumer protections 
– but the nationwide vote on November 8th did represent a backlash against the new perception of 
Great Society liberalism among the American people. This perception, embodied by the War on 
Poverty, held that the Great Society’s aims were to help the undeserving few rather than the deserving 
many. As such, when Republicans campaigned against the “Great Society” in 1966 what they were 
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often explicitly campaigning against was the War on Poverty. This was a smart strategy – had 
Republicans chosen to go after a more universalist programme, such as Medicare, then the result 
would likely have been disastrous for the party. As it was, attacking the antipoverty effort proved 
perfect fodder for Republicans seeking to make an electoral comeback from the nadir of 1964. 
 To stoke anti-War on Poverty sentiment, Republicans were relentless in tying the antipoverty 
programmes to welfare dependency. By the mid-1960s, welfare had become a salient issue, 
particularly among white voters who believed government largesse was going exclusively to what they 
perceived as lazy and riotous urban African-Americans. This is even though the War on Poverty – 
mainly a host of experimental programmes as discussed above – was not in any meaningful way a 
welfare programme.‡ All the while, Republicans continued to perform an impressive high-wire act. 
Instead of lapsing into outright negativism or advocating a scrapping of the War on Poverty, 
Republicans continued to argue that they would be better generals in the fight than the Democrats 
had proved. Indeed, while high-profile Republican candidates as ideologically diverse as Reagan, 
Brooke, Romney, and Ford campaigned forcefully against the antipoverty effort, they always did so 
with their own constructive alternative to offer as a replacement. Taken together, the campaigning of 
these four victorious Republicans is instructive of the GOP campaign in 1966. 
 
-- 
 
Ronald Reagan’s gubernatorial campaign in California was the star turn of the 1966 midterm elections. 
The former Hollywood actor emerged from the elections as the new occupant of Golden State’s 
governor’s mansion and with a national profile that was the envy of many a battle-hardened politician. 
Historians have highlighted the dual role of university protests and the Watts riots in Reagan’s victory 
over Democratic incumbent Pat Brown, but it was the former actor’s ‘Creative Society’ vision that lay 
at his campaign’s core.57 The Creative Society concept was vague in Reagan’s public words – not 
untypical of political visions – but the persistent theme that emerge was that the Creative Society 
would involve the private sector in areas that were, at the time, the sole preserve of the public sector. 
Moreover, the Creative Society was proudly anti-welfare dependency.  
As the name ‘Creative Society’ suggests, in 1966, Reagan was very much the anti-Great Society 
candidate; and in bashing the Great Society, Reagan almost always focused his rhetorical fire on 
poverty programmes.58 Reagan was loath to concede any virtue in Johnson’s War on Poverty and he 
framed the initiatives as Democrats doling out welfare to undeserving Americans. While Reagan 
                                                          
‡ The War on Poverty did, however, likely increase awareness among poorer Americans of their welfare rights 
and thus contributed to the sharp increase in those claiming assistance from the controversial Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children (AFDC) programme. 
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accepted that ‘human compassion and simple brotherhood demand that where there is need we 
should do our utmost to provide some of the comforts that make life worthwhile,’ he cautioned that 
‘this should be in response to need, and where the need is temporary, the help should be temporary, 
aimed at restoring self-sufficiency.’59  
 Declaring that ‘One of the basic laws of economics is the rule, “There ain't no such thing as a 
free lunch,”’ Reagan offered his private enterprise-led Creative Society as a viable alternative to his 
perception of the current War on Poverty: 
 
A creative society mobilizing the business and industrial community to pinpoint who is 
unemployed, where and why, and then how to make a place for them in our protective free 
economy, can fight a war on poverty, 1,000 times more effectively than government.60 
 
Pointedly, Reagan stressed the popularity of his position. By September, the GOP candidate noted 
that one of the first questions he was regularly asked by members of the public was: ‘If elected 
Governor, what will you do about welfare?’61 Reagan was therefore aware of the political damage 
that he could cause by tying the War on Poverty to voter concerns surrounding welfare dependency. 
Furthermore, in running against incumbent Democrat Pat Brown, Reagan was in competition with 
one of the nation’s state executives most in step with the antipoverty effort and the only governor 
who, in 1965, had failed to request that the governor’s veto over OEO projects remain. The stakes 
for the War on Poverty in the nation’s most populous state were clear.  
 Reagan, however, was not the only GOP headline act of 1966. Ed Brooke shared centre stage, 
becoming the first black senator since Reconstruction when he emerged victorious in the Bay State. 
Brooke, a progressive, characterised himself as a ‘Creative Republican’; a designation not too 
dissimilar from Reagan’s Creative Society vision. Brooke believed that Democrats conceived of good 
ideas but were unable to convert those ideas into workable policy due to the party’s attachment to 
city machines and the patronage demanded by such a system. Brooke reasoned that Republicans 
could run existing programmes better and also offer smarter programmes if elected.62  
 In particular, Brooke described Democratic initiatives as having a ‘very serious flaw and that 
is that the Democratic Party seems to give temporary relief to problems. It doesn’t cure the problems. 
I think that the Republican Party is the best equipped to bring about these resources.’63 In February, 
during one of his many appearances on a national television, Brooke identified the War on Poverty as 
the key programme where the GOP could make a difference. Despite widely varying political 
philosophies, Brooke agreed with Reagan’s assertion that the current antipoverty effort was 
increasing welfare dependency.64 Rather than stoke public anger with welfare or sound the klaxon for 
private enterprise to come to the rescue, Brooke instead called for increased participation by the poor 
in the antipoverty effort. 
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Given his standing as the highest-profile African American running for elected office, Brooke 
was afforded a significant media platform to voice his views on race and the War on Poverty. In doing 
so, Brooke was explicit in tying the dependency problems he outlined in his War on Poverty critique 
to the black community; perhaps giving voice to an opinion that many white politicians subscribed to 
but could not voice.65 Rather than fudge the issue of race, Brooke chose to meet it head on: ‘Let us 
admit that the great majority of people who are classified as on the borderline of poverty in this 
country are Negroes, and people who live in the ghettoes.’66 Of course, Brooke was incorrect. While 
poverty disproportionately affected the black population, a greater number of impoverished 
Americans in the country were white and belonged to rural communities.67 That this misperception 
was gaining common acceptance showed a deviation from the script that the Johnson administration 
had written in 1964, keenly aware of the pitfalls if the War on Poverty was seen as targeting the few 
rather than the many – black Americans were, after all, a minority of the population.68 Brooke, clearly 
hoping to improve rather than kill the antipoverty effort, was conceivably helping to undermine it by 
moving the War on Poverty further and further away from the image of the struggling, down-on-his-
luck, white Appalachian. As Timothy Thurber outlines, many whites – despite the advancements in 
civil rights legislation – continued to associate the black population with negative stereotypes of 
laziness, and increasingly, violence.69 Thus, they were not inclined to fund government programmes 
that catered exclusively, or at least predominantly, to black Americans.  
 Away from coastal battles, in America’s Midwestern heartland Governor George Romney was 
also battling with how best to solve poverty during his successful re-election effort in Michigan. 
Romney, on a visit to Los Angeles in late 1965, had remarked: ‘Handouts, although sometimes 
necessary and always well-intentioned, are degrading to the human spirit.’70 Romney’s statements 
during 1966 reflected a governor torn between touting his administration’s liberal record on welfare 
spending while also hoping to offer a constructive alternative to Democratic approaches to poverty. 
For instance, Romney’s campaign boasted that ‘Michigan is making full use of the Federal Economic 
Opportunity Act,’ citing a $4 million programme to aid underprivileged children.71  
 Despite his record of government intervention, Romney focused his rhetoric on volunteerism 
– a distinctive element of the Governor’s philosophy. Romney declared during his State of the State 
address in January that ‘Government alone can never solve our mounting human and social 
problems.’72 In May, Romney went further, remarking to fellow Republicans that ‘Our Republican 
opportunity in 1966 is to present superior candidates and superior programs that will turn loose 
America's vast, as-yet-untapped potential of voluntary people-power to solve the people’s problems.’ 
In particular, the former American Motors chairman cited the need for government ‘to develop 
independence, not dependence’ in those less fortunate.73 Romney’s dual critique was characteristic 
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of Republican governors in Midwestern and Northeastern states who had decided to try to use the 
EOA as much as possible, but still felt that Republicans could do a better job of drawing up the 
legislation in Washington.  
 Finally, Gerald Ford, the stalwart Minority Leader, spent the year touring the United States on 
behalf of GOP candidates and railing against the War on Poverty. Still, his speeches throughout the 
year revealed his keen awareness of the need to avoid standard GOP negativism. As a result, following 
the launch of the Opportunity Crusade in Congress, Ford promised that ‘if elected, [Republicans will] 
enter into an anti-poverty war alliance with the states and private enterprise that will muster more 
than an additional half billion dollars annually for the assault on poverty while costing taxpayers far 
less.’74 By stressing a GOP alternative that pledged more money, Ford hoped to avoid walking into a 
political trap set by the White House. At the forefront of his thinking was likely Johnson’s 1966 State 
of the Union, when, according to Ford, LBJ had ‘turned and looked directly at the Republican side of 
the Chamber, and with somewhat of a hard, snarling look said in effect to the Republicans, whom will 
they sacrifice – the poor?’75 The Minority Leader’s indignant response was a full-throated ‘no’. Ford’s 
approach, however, to stood in contrast to his Senate counterpart, Minority Leader Dirksen, who was 
less prone to finessing his argument. Responding to a question on cost-of-living rises in August, the 
Illinoisan left little to the imagination in advocating that Congress ‘put the axe at some of these “Great 
Society” programs. Look at the waste there has been in the anti-poverty program.’76 Dirksen’s 
reflexively negative approach merely served to show that he was part of an older generation of 
Republicans that, by 1966, was in the process of being replaced by newer faces like, Reagan, Brooke, 
Romney, and Ford.  
      -- 
 
Election Night 1966 made happy viewing for Republicans. Colour returned to those in the GOP who, 
watching the news two years previously had felt the blood drain from their faces. The New York Daily 
News declared that ‘The Republican Party put on a performance like … that of Mark Twain when he 
remarked that reports of his death had been greatly exaggerated.’77 British Pathé accurately described 
the election as the ‘biggest shot in the arm’ for the Republican party and focused its newsreel footage 
heavily on the victories of Ronald Reagan – already described as a potential presidential candidate – 
and Ed Brooke.78  
November 8th was also a momentous day for the War on Poverty. As voters were delivering 
their verdict at the ballot box, Johnson affixed his signature to EOA’s renewal. Following conference 
between the House and Senate, the antipoverty effort had received an appropriation of $138 million 
less than the Administration had requested. In his signing statement, Johnson chose to ignore the 
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clear political challenge that the War on Poverty had faced over the previous two months and instead 
stressed that ‘the majority of Americans [now] recognize the problem of poverty in our Nation and 
are determined to defeat it.’79 Whether this assertion was true is open to debate, but by the time 
Johnson had gone to bed that night, many Americans had repudiated the President’s agenda at the 
polls. As voters sent 47 additional Republicans to the House, three to the Senate, and installed eight 
more Republicans in governor’s mansions, LBJ’s War on Poverty was more politically vulnerable than 
ever. 
 The substantial Republican gains ensured that the Conservative Coalition regained its strength 
to rein in liberal legislation that it had briefly lost over the previous two years. Accordingly, given 
Republican campaign rhetoric, it was entirely foreseeable that, in the election’s aftermath, the War 
on Poverty would be cited as the Great Society programme that stood to lose the most. The 
Washington Post and the Christian Science Monitor both ran stories in late November that named the 
War on Poverty as likely to face the greatest challenges from the new Congress. Both press reports 
read distinctly as anonymous briefings from the Republican hierarchy on GOP strategy.80 Still, while 
the War on Poverty was prevented from growing during the rest of Johnson’s presidency, killing the 
anti-poverty effort was not an action that most Republicans, mindful of their image, were prepared to 
take just yet.  
 
Conclusion 
The year 1966 witnessed a turning of the tide against the War on Poverty both in Congress and on the 
campaign trail. On Capitol Hill, congressional Republicans – despite their lopsided minority status – 
significantly influenced EOA’s second renewal. While Quie and Goodell failed to pass their Opportunity 
Crusade, the very existence of such a detailed proposal suggested that the Republican party was 
grappling seriously with how best to use their role as the opposition party to propel the GOP into the 
majority. Gone, it seemed, were the days when, in the words of Ed Brooke, Republicans ‘would rather 
lose the ball game just as long as they decide who is going to pitch.’ Moreover, by stressing ‘creative’ 
solutions and ‘constructive alternatives’ to antipoverty programmes, the GOP were making their first 
significant step to becoming the ‘party of ideas’ as Democratic Senator, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, 
famously remarked in 1981.81 A nomenclature that would play significantly better with the electorate 
than the “Party of No”.  
 The Republican challenge to the War on Poverty in 1966 was also the GOP’s first significant 
electoral success in campaigning against a socio-economic programme of the New Deal/Great Society 
era. Unsurprisingly, such success did not go unnoticed by the most astute of political observers. In 
1968, Richard Nixon – who had appeared with GOP candidates across the country in 1966 – singled 
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out the War on Poverty as the Great Society programme he would most significantly alter during his 
presidential run.82 Yet, once elected, Nixon would appoint the liberal Moynihan as a key policy adviser 
on poverty, while devoting his first significant presidential speech on domestic policy to stressing his 
commitment to finding new, innovative solutions to poverty.83 The Republican high-wire act with 
regards to poverty policy would thus maintain its balance well into Nixon’s presidency.  
 There remains scope for a full study that examines the Republican role in undermining and 
prematurely ending Johnson’s War on Poverty. Historians have effectively chronicled the antipoverty 
effort’s shortcomings and the disillusionment it occasioned among certain Democrats, but they have 
failed to identify how the Republican party’s consistent opposition ensured that the War on Poverty 
would never gain the bi-partisan acceptance required to sustain it through times when the Democratic 
party no longer held power. While Johnson’s antipoverty effort certainly left itself open to criticism, 
Republicans were often adroit in their opposition. A political vacuum, after all, does not fill itself. 
Beginning in 1965, the GOP coupled harsh anti-War on Poverty rhetoric with their own moderate 
alternatives – a smart strategy to avoid appearing overly negative. As the Johnson presidency wore on 
and the War on Poverty fell further in the public’s estimation, Republicans used the antipoverty effort 
as the poster child policy for criticising the entire Great Society. This approach would help tar the 
entire creed of Great Society liberalism – or, indeed, liberalism as a whole – and assist the Republican 
party in its electoral rise in the following decades.  
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